

AF RI CA

**BULLETIN
ISSUE 08**

16-24 OCTOBER 2026

By Hasret Kargin & Levent Kemal

IN THIS ISSUE

AFRICA BULLETIN / ISSUE 08

16-24 October 2026

EDITOR’S NOTE	03
----------------------	-----------

CONFLICT AND WAR	04
-------------------------	-----------

DIPLOMACY	09
------------------	-----------

ENERGY	13
---------------	-----------

MINING	17
---------------	-----------

CONCLUSION	21
-------------------	-----------

Selected developments in security, diplomacy, energy and mining.
Coverage includes both 16 and 24 October 2026.

EDITOR'S NOTE

Africa's principal developments between 16 and 24 October connected contested political authority with immediate pressures on civilian protection and economic activity. In Sudan and disputed Abyei, attacks on markets, fuel infrastructure and communities intensified humanitarian needs. Eastern Congo's renewed fighting disrupted movement and schooling, while Somalia's South West confrontation complicated an already fragmented security environment.

Diplomacy continued across those conflicts. The AES-ECOWAS talks in Dakar created a process for negotiating cooperation between separate regional entities. Algeria and Niger strengthened their military relationship, while Somalia's Galmudug election produced a new leadership without resolving the national electoral dispute. In Sudan, demands for a humanitarian truce remained distant from the military leadership's stated conditions for negotiations.

Energy and mining provided substantial investment prospects, but their stages differed. Somalia's offshore drilling remained exploration, Angola's proposed licensing reform required further adoption, and Namibia's Venus oil development still faced a commercial test. Etango's uranium investment decision represented a more advanced commitment, while lithium ventures and processing strategies remained dependent on studies, finance and infrastructure.

This edition concentrates on developments with the greatest regional, security or economic significance. Related reports are combined into a single account, with later updates incorporated through the 24 October cutoff. Competing casualty assessments, allegations and company targets retain their qualifications. The distinction between an announced commitment and an implemented outcome remains central to assessing what changed during the period.



Caption

CONFLICT AND WAR

SUDAN AND ABYEI



Caption

A market attack becomes a regional crisis

The October 19 drone attacks on Amiet market in disputed Abyei generated a major humanitarian emergency and a confrontation between Sudan and South Sudan. Local authorities reported that the death toll had reached 153 by October 21, with others missing and roughly 8,000 people displaced. Fuel-storage facilities caught fire, and UNISFA deployed medical teams, firefighters and rapid-response personnel.

The final toll remained unresolved. A separate monitor recorded nineteen deaths and approximately fifty-one injuries, while earlier local-official accounts gave other figures. These assessments concern the same attacks and cannot be added together. South Sudan blamed Sudan's army and summoned its ambassador. An unnamed Sudanese military officer described strikes against fuel tankers believed to supply the RSF and denied deliberate targeting of civilians; that explanation was not independently established.

Air attacks and hunger compound civilian exposure

Nyala also remained a focus of competing accounts after the October 16 market strike. Monitors,

medical organisations and officials offered differing casualty assessments, while military reporting described attacks on RSF positions. Neither the competing figures nor assertions about the intended targets supplied a common verified account. The incidents reinforced concern about the exposure of commercial areas to aerial warfare.

By October 23, the United States, United Kingdom and twenty-nine partners were warning of a deepening food emergency. Their statement cited estimates of 19.5 million people facing high acute food insecurity, including five million at emergency levels. These are crisis estimates rather than new weekly case counts. The partners urged unrestricted cross-border and cross-line relief, faster administrative clearances and protection of aid workers.

On October 24, Emergency Lawyers proposed relief centres providing food, water and healthcare and called for protection of civilian routes and water sources. The proposal did not establish that centres had opened. Across Sudan and Abyei, humanitarian access and credible investigation remained more immediate tests of progress than either side's claims of military advantage.

DR CONGO



Caption

Renewed fighting exposes the limits of peace commitments

Congolese forces and allied Wazalendo renewed operations against FRN positions at Kibati in Walikale on October 16. Local accounts described three days of heavy and small-arms fire, followed by a fragile lull on October 19. The FRN was still reported to control the locality. The lull therefore did not establish a successful government recapture or a lasting cessation of hostilities.

Residents of surrounding villages fled into the bush, while uncertainty over security complicated their return. Kibati's position on the Goma-Walikale route made the fighting relevant to civilian movement and supply as well as territorial control. Reliable casualty and damage totals remained unavailable.

In South Kivu, clashes resumed around Mitimbili, Muhumba and Mwera in Kaziba on October 20. Local observers described FRN attempts to advance while government forces and Wazalendo sought to retain positions. By October 21, local organisations reported that more than 12,000 households had fled towards neighbouring chiefdoms and Bukavu. That estimate was not a completed, independently

verified registration, and partial local counts should not be added to it.

Protection needs extend beyond the main frontline

Repeated fighting also disrupted education. Runambi primary school, relocated to Kibarizo in Masisi, lacked desks and essential supplies more than a month after the school year began. Its situation demonstrated how displacement affects basic services even when children have reached a different location.

In Ituri, a local monitoring organisation attributed an attack on mining sites during the night leading into October 16 to the ADF and reported ten deaths. Security authorities had not confirmed the toll. The mining-site violence was distinct from the FRN confrontation and added to concerns about civilian livelihoods and access for health responders.

These developments showed the distance between diplomatic commitments and local conditions. A quieter day at one position, a political declaration or a change in armed-group organisation did not guarantee safe roads, functioning schools or the return of displaced communities.

SOMALIA



Caption

South West confrontation widens around Baidoa

Forces aligned with former South West president Abdiiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen reported gains across Bay region, including Berdaale, Diinsoor, Awdiinle and Buurhakaba. Residents described withdrawals by government-aligned forces and, at Buurhakaba, heavy fighting. Laftagareen presented the operations as a restoration of legitimate regional authority; the current administration rejected that interpretation.

Buurhakaba's position on the Baidoa-Mogadishu road gave the confrontation immediate implications for trade, civilian travel and military supply. Subsequent reports described federal and regional mobilisation to regain the districts. On October 24, witnesses reported renewed federal movements towards Buurhakaba after an earlier convoy encountered an Al-Shabaab attack. Reported vehicle losses were not accompanied by a complete official casualty assessment.

The federal-regional dispute and Al-Shabaab's operations overlapped geographically but remained distinct developments. Accusations that Laftagareen's forces had joined the insurgents were denied and not independently established. Treating all attacks on federal troops as evidence

of a single alliance would obscure both the political confrontation and the insurgency.

New allegations raise the external dimension

On October 24, Laftagareen accused Türkiye of conducting air operations that harmed civilians around Wajid and Baidoa. He named aircraft types and alleged deaths, injuries and destruction, but the available evidence did not independently confirm the platforms, casualties or Turkish responsibility. His appeal for international intervention and investigation remained an attributed political demand, not a judicial finding.

Puntland separately said its forces killed two Al-Shabaab members laying mines near Galgala. That announcement followed a reported mine explosion affecting troops and preparations for further operations in the Calmadow mountains. The claimed identities and outcome were the authorities' account.

The immediate strategic concern was the diversion of forces and political attention into competing struggles for authority. The civilian consequences depended on access to roads and services and on whether the parties could contain escalation around populated areas.

MALI AND ETHIOPIA



Caption

Mali: civilian killings alongside military operations

Community representatives reported at least forty-eight civilians killed in an October 18 attack near Tagadayat in the Ménaka region. The Idaksahak community's executive bureau blamed Islamic State in the Sahel. Several people were reportedly wounded and hundreds of families fled towards Ménaka town. The toll and attribution remained the community's account rather than a reconciled official assessment.

Mali's army continued to publicise the Dougoukoloko campaign. It said an October 20 strike targeted a gathering of motorcyclists in the Ouagadou forest after surveillance of several columns. The military described those attacked as militants and reported deaths without a precise verified count. Its statement did not resolve the identities of all those present or possible civilian harm.

A separate October 23 Human Rights Watch investigation alleged that a September drone strike at Guélédié killed civilians and that Malian and Africa Corps personnel tortured detainees at Sévaré. The allegations concerned earlier incidents newly addressed during this reporting period. Witness accounts differed from the army's description of its Guélédié target; they were not court findings.

Ethiopia: political reorganisation does not end the fighting

Ethiopia's federal government announced a new six-month Tigray administration on October 16, with responsibilities for services, stabilisation, displaced residents' return and election preparations. The TPLF rejected its legitimacy and warned regional institutions against cooperation. Registration of former fighters for reintegration proceeded alongside the dispute, without establishing completion of the wider disarmament programme.

The TPLF subsequently claimed exceptionally heavy federal casualties in fighting around Merina. Those figures lacked independent verification and no government response was available in the account. They should not be treated as an established battlefield balance.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's warning to Eritrea against supporting Ethiopian armed opponents added a regional escalation risk. The coexistence of a new administration, reintegration activity and renewed fighting claims showed that control of institutions and urban centres had not settled the underlying political or military confrontation.

DIPLOMACY

SUDAN AND LIBYA



Caption

Sudan: truce demands meet a hard negotiating position

International calls for a humanitarian truce remained distant from the conditions advanced by Sudan's military leadership. In his October 21 Wadi Halfa speech, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan rejected negotiations with the RSF unless it surrendered its weapons and opposed the return of former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok. He invoked elections as the route to deciding leadership but supplied no timetable for conducting them during the war.

US diplomacy continued to emphasise a humanitarian pause followed by inclusive political dialogue. Burhan's correspondence and foreign contacts demonstrated continuing engagement but did not establish acceptance of a ceasefire or agreement on a transition. Civilian opponents also disputed the military's effort to determine who could participate in Sudan's political future.

The Amiet attacks intensified the regional dimension. South Sudan's diplomatic protest, African Union condemnation and demands for investigation placed civilian protection in disputed Abyei alongside the wider Sudan peace agenda. The immediate question was whether these responses could produce access and restraint rather than additional statements alone.

Through October 24, Norway and the United Kingdom also pressed Sudan to cooperate with scrutiny of alleged chemical-weapons use. The United States had previously made a determination concerning use in 2024; Sudan's military denied the allegations. That earlier US determination should remain distinct from a publicly completed independent OPCW inquiry into specific incidents and from evidence establishing individual criminal responsibility.

Libya: judicial fragmentation complicates elections

UNSMIL linked the unification of Libya's judiciary to credible national elections. Deputy representative Stephanie Koury and Prosecutor General al-Siddiq al-Sour discussed the need for legal certainty, consistent authority and confidence in the electoral process.

The consultations did not announce a merger of competing structures, a national election date or a completed implementation mechanism. Their significance lay in identifying an institutional condition for a credible vote. Libya's political timetable remained dependent on resolving divisions capable of undermining both election preparation and acceptance of the result.

SOMALIA AND THE HORN



Caption

A regional election leaves national disagreements intact

Somalia's Galmudug leadership election produced a declared winner and federal congratulations without resolving disputes over the country's broader electoral framework. Liibaan Ahmed Hassan received seventy-two votes against fourteen for his opponent, with three invalid ballots, according to the announced result. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre welcomed the new leadership on October 22.

Opposition reactions were divided. Former prime minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, former Galmudug president Abdikarim Hussein Guled and other figures congratulated Hassan, while critics continued to question whether the process commanded sufficient consensus. Acceptance of a regional outcome therefore did not demonstrate agreement across the opposition or endorsement of the national timetable.

The Somali Future Council rejected election dates extending into 2027 and renewed demands for a negotiated political agreement. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud defended the authority of state institutions while calling for dialogue and peaceful expression of differing views. His position did not resolve opponents' objections over the rules and timing of elections.

Security disputes sharpen the cost of political fragmentation

The confrontation in South West State gave these disagreements an immediate security dimension. Laftagareen demanded federal withdrawal and negotiations while government supporters sought to restore control of districts in Bay. A settlement of the regional leadership dispute would require more than the outcome of a separate Galmudug vote.

In the northern Horn, Ethiopia's Tigray administration dispute coincided with Abiy Ahmed's warning against Eritrean support for armed opponents. Ethiopian allegations of external involvement and Eritrean denials remained contested. Political warnings alone did not establish the scale of cross-border military activity.

Across both settings, the practical test was whether formal institutions could command acceptance beyond their immediate supporters. Elections, appointments and diplomatic contacts could provide channels for de-escalation, but they could also deepen confrontation if military pressure substituted for a broader agreement.

REGIONAL DIPLOMACY



Caption

AES and ECOWAS open a practical negotiating channel

AES and ECOWAS ministers agreed after the October 17 Dakar talks to establish joint thematic working groups for a cooperation framework. The technical results are to return to a subsequent ministerial session. Preparatory meetings and the joint communiqué showed renewed engagement after the Sahel states' withdrawal, but not an agreed return to ECOWAS membership.

The AES ministers emphasised sovereignty and negotiations between separate entities. Their position left room for practical arrangements on regional relations without reversing the confederation's political choice. For landlocked Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, workable cooperation with coastal neighbours remains relevant to movement, trade and security coordination.

The delegation also met its diaspora in Senegal on October 18. Administrative and consular concerns added a concrete community dimension to the negotiations. The meeting did not itself create a new residence or migration regime.

Algeria and Niger deepen defence contacts

Algeria and Niger signed a military cooperation protocol in Algiers during Salifou Mody's visit. The published accounts place the signing within a

series of high-level contacts and a rapprochement between the two governments. The concrete provisions were not disclosed, preventing firm conclusions about new troop commitments, equipment deliveries or a joint-operation timetable.

The release of Austrian and Swiss women previously abducted in Niger, followed by their arrival in Benghazi, separately highlighted eastern Libya's regional role. Officials credited Saddam Haftar's involvement, while the terms of release and the complete circumstances remained undisclosed.

Congo: diplomatic pressure confronts implementation gaps

Belgium condemned Joseph Kabila's reported leadership of an armed political front while backing the Doha and Washington peace processes. Other international calls emphasised verification and implementation of commitments. Those positions coincided with continuing clashes and displacement in the Kivus, illustrating the gap between support for negotiations and conditions on the ground.

The period's diplomacy was therefore significant principally as a set of mechanisms still to be tested. Working groups, defence protocols and statements of support become consequential when they alter access, coordination and compliance.

ENERGY

SOMALIA AND ANGOLA



Caption

Somalia: offshore exploration remains a resource test

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud inspected Türkiye's Çağrı Bey drilling vessel and received a technical briefing on the Curad-1 exploration well. The October 17 account described a helicopter visit to the ship's control room and discussion of drilling progress, equipment and preliminary findings.

The programme envisages drilling to approximately 7,500 metres in water roughly 3,480 metres deep, over an operation planned for 288 days. It follows earlier offshore seismic work and energy agreements between Somalia and Türkiye. These technical milestones and the political visibility of the partnership did not amount to an announced commercial discovery.

No commercially recoverable reserve estimate had been disclosed. The economic significance consequently remains prospective: drilling must establish whether a viable resource exists before production, revenue or employment benefits can be assessed with confidence.

Angola: licensing reform and construction move at different stages

Angola's regulator proposed moving from scheduled licensing rounds towards a more continuous framework. Plans described opening additional

blocks and shortening award periods, with implementation dependent on adoption of a twenty-five-year hydrocarbons strategy. The proposal did not establish that every identified block had been awarded or that the new regime was fully operating.

The approximately \$6 billion Kaminho development, by contrast, was reported to have passed the halfway point. ANPG and project partners inspected subsea equipment manufacturing in Malaysia, with deliveries to Angola planned from 2027. Production remained targeted for 2028; manufacturing progress was not an announcement of first oil.

Angola also revised its expected 2026 fuel-subsidy bill to 3.8 trillion kwanzas against 1.7 trillion initially budgeted. Higher oil prices increased the cost of supplying regulated domestic fuel even as they supported export receipts. The figure was a revised official expectation, not a final budget-execution result.

Together, the developments combined investment promotion, tangible project progress and fiscal pressure. Their different stages matter when assessing the speed at which petroleum activity can translate into dependable public revenue and domestic supply.

FUEL AND OFFSHORE OIL



Caption

Libya and Niger: supply conditions remain uneven

Libya's Brega company reported moving three million litres of fuel through a southern distribution route, alongside other tanker and LPG delivery announcements. These were company accounts of specific logistics operations, rather than proof that shortages had ended in every locality.

The operational importance of infrastructure was reinforced by NOC warnings that a closed valve on the Hamada-Zawiya pipeline threatened production and by discussions of delayed cargoes and berth maintenance. Libya's oil and fuel system continued to depend on reliable transport links and coordination between institutions as well as upstream capacity.

In Niger, motorists in Niamey described persistent queues and difficulty obtaining petrol despite assurances that the shortage had been resolved. Residents linked the disruption to commuting and ordinary economic activity. The accounts did not identify a verified common cause or a timetable for a complete restoration of supplies.

Namibia: Venus approaches a commercial decision

TotalEnergies received contractor offers for major packages of the proposed Venus development, but

an investment decision remained dependent on unresolved commercial arrangements. The reported investment requirement was \$14 billion-\$17 billion, with a first-oil objective around 2030 and proposed capacity of approximately 150,000-160,000 barrels a day.

Negotiations concerned fiscal terms, local participation and associated gas. The company favoured reinjection, while the government expressed interest in bringing gas ashore for domestic use. Technical readiness and contractor pricing therefore did not establish final sanction or authorisation of full construction.

Namibia's wider petroleum framework also remained contested. A parliamentary vote on the petroleum bill stalled after an opposition walkout removed the quorum. The proposed transfer of powers to a unit under the presidency raised questions over oversight; the failed vote did not mean those powers had already taken effect.

The cases distinguish three different tests: whether fuel reaches consumers, whether infrastructure operates reliably, and whether a major project's commercial and regulatory conditions can be settled. Positive movement in one area should not be read as resolution of the others.

GAS AND ELECTRICITY



Caption

Mozambique advances a further floating LNG phase

Eni's planned early-November drilling for Coral Norte placed Mozambique's next floating LNG development at a new operational preparation stage. The project is designed for annual capacity of 3.6 million tonnes, with production expected in 2028. Those are future milestones rather than output already added to the market.

Coral Sul, the field's operating first phase, has capacity of 3.4 million tonnes annually. If delivered as planned, the two facilities would provide approximately seven million tonnes of combined capacity. Financing approvals, engineering contracts and vessel construction form part of the development record; the contribution of Coral Norte still depends on completion and commissioning.

South Africa widens procurement and storage options

Ekurhuleni received approval on October 19 to procure up to 2,400 MW from independent electricity producers. The programme combines solar, gas, waste-to-energy and other technologies, diversifying a portfolio previously described as entirely dependent on Eskom. Approval creates a

procurement pathway; it does not establish that all capacity has been contracted or built.

South Africa's government also announced temporary fuel-levy reductions costing an estimated R10 billion, with initial relief scheduled for November 4-December 1. The measure addressed immediate cost pressures, a different policy task from developing generating assets or long-duration storage. Short-term relief and structural supply investment should be assessed separately.

Infrastructure determines the value of new capacity

Across the regional coverage, additional supply depended on transmission, reliable fuel logistics, financing and credible purchasing arrangements. Proposals for municipal procurement and future LNG exports can broaden options without immediately improving household or industrial access.

For electricity-intensive manufacturing and mineral processing, the relevant test is dependable delivery at a viable cost. Announced megawatts or liquefaction capacity indicate potential scale; commissioning, grid access and sustained operations determine the practical economic benefit.

MINING

DR CONGO



Caption

Artisanal access and market controls trigger unrest

Demonstrations by artisanal miners around Kolwezi continued into a second day on October 20, with barricades, fires and gunfire reported near mining areas and parts of the city. Shops and schools closed in affected neighbourhoods, while some industrial workers were unable to reach their workplaces.

Miners objected to inspections and restrictions affecting processing centres and buying counters, arguing that the measures obstructed sales and threatened livelihoods. They also sought access to the thirty-three legal artisanal-mining zones announced by the government. Reports of deaths and damage remained unreconciled, with no verified final casualty total.

By October 21, local reporting described a gradual and uneven return to calm. Governor Fifi Masuka said no processing factory had been closed, while officials presented the enforcement operation as an effort to improve the mining environment. The difference between official assurances and miners' experiences left the underlying questions of access and marketing unresolved.

Refining ambitions depend on preparation and power

Buenassa outlined a study programme for a proposed \$700 million copper-cobalt refinery in Lualaba. A \$3.4 million US Trade and Development Agency grant would support preparation, including pre-feasibility and environmental work and the appointment of a consultant. It was not financing for the full refinery investment.

The company described approximately two years of studies before final financial close. Construction approval, a firm production timetable and secured long-term finance had not been established. The project's strategic rationale is domestic value retention, but the immediate development was preparation for an eventual investment case.

SNELs warning that metal theft threatened the Inga-Shaba electricity line underscored a related constraint. Processing investment depends on a reliable power system as well as mineral availability. The week's unrest and refining proposals thus highlighted two sides of sector development: enforceable and workable rules for existing livelihoods, and the infrastructure needed for more advanced production.

LITHIUM



Caption

Kodal adds a staged Ghana exploration option

Kodal Minerals agreed to acquire up to eighty percent of Ghana's Asamankese lithium project through staged investment. An initial ten percent interest cost \$300,000, while further spending and payments would increase ownership subject to technical milestones, including a resource estimate and feasibility work.

The company expected initial drilling before year-end and said it intended to use existing cash and mine cash flow rather than a fresh equity issue. Its comparison with earlier work at Mali's Bougouni was a company assessment. Asamankese remained early exploration: no resource estimate established the deposit's size, and ownership options did not amount to a producing mine.

Springbok attracts preliminary financing interest

South Africa's Springbok project received two nonbinding proposals. One envisaged advance financing against the first three years of spodumene concentrate output; another proposed a \$60 million equity investment divided between drilling and a larger processing plant.

Neither partner was identified and no definitive agreement had been concluded. Resource and economic studies and a financing decision remained ahead. The proposals demonstrated interest in the

project, rather than committed funds, guaranteed sales or an established battery-grade manufacturing operation.

Zimbabwe keeps pressure on domestic processing

Zimbabwe retained its January 2027 deadline for banning lithium-concentrate exports. The policy sought to move more processing into the country, but producers approached the deadline with different facilities and arrangements. Existing restrictions and the coming concentrate requirement should not be described as a single measure already uniformly implemented.

Huayou's Arcadia lithium-sulphate facility had begun exports earlier in 2026, while additional processing capacity elsewhere remained under development. Its capacity primarily served the company's own operations. The ability of every producer to meet the deadline therefore could not be inferred from one plant's commissioning.

The three cases illustrate distinct commercial stages: an exploration acquisition, preliminary funding proposals and a regulatory deadline affecting operating businesses. Their significance depends on technical results, binding commitments and the availability of appropriate processing infrastructure.

URANIUM AND PROCESSING



Caption

Etango moves beyond the investment-decision threshold

Bannerman Energy announced the final investment decision for Namibia's Etango uranium project on October 23. The company targeted first production in 2028 and estimated construction costs of \$353 million, including approximately \$64 million already committed to preliminary works.

The development is designed for annual output of 3.5 million pounds over fifteen years. CNNC Overseas' \$320.4 million commitment was presented as enabling construction without debt. These financing arrangements and the decision marked a substantive advance, while commercial production remained a future objective dependent on construction and commissioning.

The position differed from Deep Yellow's Tumas project, where the company withdrew its fourth-quarter investment-decision target amid unfavourable equity conditions and continued preparation without a replacement date. Namibia's uranium sector therefore did not move through financing and development as a single uniform programme.

Ghana links mineral policy to a broader industrial shift

President John Mahama proposed a phased end to raw mineral exports by 2030, tailored to individual commodities. The direction covered minerals

such as bauxite, manganese, iron and lithium. It required legal changes and enabling investments rather than imposing an immediately effective blanket prohibition.

Reliable and affordable power remained a common limitation on processing ambitions. Guinea's industrial plans were associated with electricity requirements of 5,000-10,000 MW against production of roughly 1,000 MW. The figures were official assessments of the gap, not a funded programme already delivered.

Operating capacity offers a different benchmark

South Africa inaugurated Gamsberg's second-phase concentrator on October 16, completing construction intended to double annual zinc capacity to 500,000 tonnes. The new installation still required ramp-up. Completed construction, nameplate capacity and actual annual production remained different measures.

Etango, Tumas, Ghana's policy proposal and Gamsberg together showed why project stages matter. Mineral endowment and political ambition can open opportunities, but finance, energy, operational performance and implementation determine the pace at which those opportunities become economic output.

CONCLUSION

The period ended with no common resolution across Africa's principal conflict zones. Sudan's market attacks and hunger emergency, continued displacement in eastern Congo and Somalia's struggle over South West authority all placed civilian access at the centre of the security agenda. Changes in territorial claims or institutional leadership did not establish a durable reduction in those risks.

Diplomacy nevertheless retained practical openings. AES and ECOWAS created working mechanisms, Algeria and Niger strengthened contacts, and international actors continued to support peace frameworks and accountability. Their value will depend on cooperation that affects movement, humanitarian access and compliance, rather than the number of meetings or declarations.

Energy and mining developments showed a similarly uneven transition from intention to implementation. Exploration in Somalia, proposed petroleum reforms, Venus negotiations and preliminary lithium offers remained conditional. Etango's

investment decision, Kaminho's construction progress and Gamsberg's completed concentrator represented different, more concrete milestones, each with further operating tests ahead.

Priorities after the cutoff

The most consequential questions are whether civilians can use roads and markets safely; whether political and electoral arrangements gain acceptance beyond their immediate sponsors; and whether regional cooperation produces workable measures. In the resource sectors, the corresponding tests are binding finance, reliable electricity, construction delivery and the treatment of affected workers and communities.

These developments should be judged against their stated conditions. A declared lull is not yet a settlement, a signed framework is not an operating mechanism, and a production target is not output already available. That distinction links the edition's four sections and provides a consistent basis for assessing what follows the 24 October cutoff.



Caption



a new-generation international consultancy specialising in the fields of conflict, energy
and geopolitical analysis.

Istanbul, Turkey
contact@mintelworld.com
www.mintelworld.com

