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EDITOR'S NOTE

During the week of 3–10 September 2026, the African continent witnessed critical developments across the fields of conflict, diplomacy, energy, and mining. While the spillover of the civil war in Sudan into the Blue Nile region and the deepening humanitarian crisis escalated regional instability, competition among jihadist groups in the Sahel, alongside gang violence and piracy, heightened security risks. On the diplomatic front, fragile steps regarding the electoral process in Libya, constitutional amendments in South Sudan, and the African Union's early warning mechanisms stood out, while Somalia's accession to the AfCFTA and the UN General Assembly's "Correct the Map" resolution reflected the continent's pursuit of global integration. In the energy and mining sectors, against the backdrop of global geopolitical pressures and the financial burden imposed by the Strait of Hormuz crisis, moves by countries like the DRC and Nigeria to increase state oversight and local processing capacity over critical raw materials once again highlighted Africa's struggle to bridge the gap between its resource wealth and state capacity.

Levent Kemal

Executive Director, MINTEL WORLD

OVERVIEW

Developments across Africa during the week of 3–10 September 2026 were concentrated around four main areas: conflict, diplomacy, energy, and mining.

On the conflict front, the SAF-RSF war in Sudan opened a new front in the Blue Nile region, while hunger, cholera, and airstrikes deepened the humanitarian crisis in Kordofan and Darfur. UN sources confirmed that at least 12 countries have provided military support to the warring parties. In Niger, military ties with Russia deepened following the suppression of the mutiny, while insecurity persisted in Tillabéri. In Mali and Burkina Faso, competition between JNIM and ISSP intensified across Liptako-Gourma. The FAMA continued Russian-backed air operations, while Burkina Faso demonstrated its air defence capabilities for the first time. In the DRC, AFC/M23 deepened its military and administrative expansion across North and South Kivu. Diplomatic channels remained active through contacts between Kagame and MONUSCO and between Tshisekedi and Angola. In Somalia, a Turkish drone strike developed into a regional political crisis, while piracy reached its highest level in a decade. In Mozambique, ISM became visible in Niassa for the first time. In Ethiopia, tensions in Tigray and Amhara tested the African Union's early warning capacity. In Nigeria, kidnappings surged again, while ISWAP's use of artificial intelligence drew attention. In South Africa, anti-migrant violence continued in Durban, while Operation Prosper in Cape Town produced a limited decline in the murder rate.

On the diplomatic front, the 4+4 Committee agreement in Libya created a fragile threshold for the electoral process, while a plan for cooperation between eastern and western commanders was signed in Sirte. The Morocco-Algeria-Spain track continued to generate political tensions months after the mass migrant entry into Ceuta. South

Sudan moved quickly to remove constitutional obstacles ahead of the December elections, while the SPLA-IO faced a deepening leadership crisis. Algeria tightened its internal security agenda in response to forest fires and the fight against drugs. Across the continent, the UN General Assembly's «Correct the Map» resolution and Somalia becoming the 50th country to ratify the AfCFTA reflected Africa's efforts to strengthen global and regional integration.

In the energy sector, Libya remained unable to overcome its chronic electricity and fuel crisis despite rising crude oil production, while drone attacks on infrastructure continued. In Nigeria, NNPC revenues declined, while domestic refining capacity remained insufficient to meet internal demand. Attacks on electricity infrastructure continued in Sudan, while Uganda announced its first commercial crude oil blend. The Strait of Hormuz crisis added a \$21.9 billion bill to 32 African countries between March and August 2026, highlighting the vulnerability gap between energy-importing and energy-exporting countries. New exploration and cooperation initiatives continued in Angola, Tunisia, and Libya.

In mining, the DRC prepared to bring geological data under state control, while restrictions on copper and cobalt exports sharpened competition between the United States and China. In Sudan, artisanal gold production remained largely outside state control and became a source of financing for armed groups. Kenya began seeking new investors for Lake Magadi, while Guinea moved toward localising bauxite refining. Nigeria focused on Chinese integration of iron ore and steel production. Forecasts that copper prices could reach a record \$15,000 in early 2027 further highlighted the gap between Africa's resource wealth and state capacity.

CONFLICT AND WAR

SUDAN

Escalation in the RSF-Army War and Foreign Intervention Networks

The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) expanded into a new front in the Blue Nile region along the Ethiopian border. On 3 September, Army Commander and Sovereignty Council Chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan travelled to Ed Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile, to inspect troops on the front line.

He reviewed operational plans against the RSF and its ally, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N). Abdelati Mohamed El Faki, the commissioner of Kurmuk, alleged that the RSF operates four training camps inside neighbouring Ethiopia with support from the United Arab Emirates. He also claimed that the camps are used for drone operations and logistical support. Fighting in Blue Nile triggered a major wave of displacement from the Geissan and Kurmuk areas. Pekka Haavisto, the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Sudan, travelled to Khartoum on 5 September to discuss measures to protect civilians.

The humanitarian cost of the war continued to rise across Kordofan and Darfur. An airstrike near Dilling in South Kordofan hit two trucks belonging to the World Food Programme. More than 50 tonnes of food aid were destroyed. The Sudan Founding Alliance, the political arm of the RSF, blamed the SAF for the attack. In North Kordofan, a SAF warplane struck the village of Jafawa, killing four civilians, including a woman and a child from the same family.

The RSF targeted a UN humanitarian convoy in South Kordofan, killing one person and injuring two others. Around El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, the RSF and allied forces continued to strengthen earthworks and trenches. Restrictions on civilian movement were tightened. A cholera outbreak in West Kordofan killed at least 10 people within two days and infected more than 40 others. According to the World Health Organization, the number of cases nationwide had exceeded 2,600 as of early August. In the Malha area of North Darfur, 6,200 children were suffering from acute malnutrition.

The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, in a report presented to the Human Rights Council in Geneva, found that the war had spread far beyond the front lines. Both sides were using advanced drone technology supplied from abroad to strike civilian infrastructure and markets. The mission determined that such attacks could constitute war crimes.

Massad Boulos, a senior adviser to the Trump administration responsible for Africa and Asia, said that at least 12 countries had provided some form of military support to the warring parties. He described this as «very sad». A separate UN investigation identified cross-border networks involving the United Arab Emirates, Colombia, Chad, Libya, and Somalia that facilitated the movement of fighters, weapons, training, and logistics to the RSF. Some locations inside Libya were also confirmed to be used as corridors for the movement of weapons and personnel. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk renewed his call for a ceasefire and urged an end to attacks on hospitals, markets, and fuel stations.

The Sudanese pound fell to a historic low. Food and construction costs surged. Disruptions to mobile banking services affected transactions across the country.

Burhan's proposed national dialogue initiative caused divisions within Sudan. Sudanese political and civil groups opposed to the war submitted a formal memorandum to the African Union, warning that the process could further fragment the country's political and territorial integrity. Some circles viewed the dialogue as an attempt to strengthen the influence of the Islamic Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood within the Port Sudan administration. The International Organization for Migration carried out the first voluntary return flight from Khartoum since the war began in April 2023. A limited humanitarian corridor was opened for stranded migrants.


NIGER.

Following the suppression of the mutiny, demonstrations in support of Tiani were held in Niamey. Junta supporters and ministers also joined the crowds. Following the Council of Ministers meeting on 4 September, the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) described the mutiny as the work of «traitorous and renegade» soldiers who had been manipulated into serving a foreign agenda. The junta directly accused former French President Emmanuel Macron and a wider Paris-based network. The government said it was gathering evidence to support the allegations and reserved the right to take the matter to international courts. France had previously denied accusations of interference in Niger's internal affairs.

The security situation in western Niger deteriorated following the mutiny. On 2 September, armed attackers raided the villages of Darbani, Diamballa, and Namarigoungou in the Tillabéri region. Civilian casualties and livestock losses were reported. In Diamballa, two young girls drowned in a pond while attempting to flee the attack.

Approximately one week after the mutiny, on 4 September, Russian Ambassador to Niger Viktor Voropaev was received by President Tiani. Although the meeting was officially focused on strengthening bilateral cooperation, Nigerien authorities used the occasion to thank Moscow for its support following the «attack» on the night of 28–29 August. The government confirmed that Russia had played an important role in suppressing the mutiny. The development shows that Niger's ties with Russia's post-Wagner military presence have deepened further in the post-coup period.

“The government confirmed that Russia had played an important role in suppressing the mutiny.”



MALI AND BURKINA FASO

In Mali, two of the world's deadliest jihadist organisations continue to attack each other. Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have been openly fighting since 2020 for control of the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area where Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger meet. The region accounts for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide.

ISSP launched a new round of clashes by ambushing a JNIM position near Ndaki, close to the Burkina Faso border. A senior commander who defected from JNIM to ISSP in February was hunted down and killed by JNIM in July. In August, an ISSP emir was ambushed and killed. The rivalry has intensified again.

The Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) continued the «Dougoukoloko» operation in this environment. With support from Russian military units, FAMA forces carried out a series of air operations against JNIM and FLA positions in recent weeks. On 3 September, terrorist hideouts and significant weapons stockpiles were destroyed in precision strikes in the Kidal region.

The intelligence-backed operation was based on reliable sources. Malian media have interpreted the operation through a broad security map stretching from the country's northeast to the western corridors, from the Inner Niger Delta to southern crossing points. FAMA's mission to regain territory is being portrayed as an approach that combines military force with diplomacy.

In Burkina Faso, the army took a step that made its air defence capabilities more visible. On 1 September, the presidency released footage showing the National Armed Forces (FAN) conducting a live-fire test of a mobile surface-to-air missile system for the first time. This was the first time the country publicly demonstrated its radar-guided air defence capabilities.

The footage showed a mobile air-surveillance radar with a rotating antenna, three soldiers monitoring screens inside a command cabin, and a wheeled launcher firing a missile from one of two containers. Major General Célestin Simporé, Minister of State for War and Patriotic Defence, referred to new acquisitions, including surface-to-air artillery, without naming specific systems. Findings that gold mines in the region finance terrorist organisations show that the conflict economy in the Sahel is sustained not only by political factors but also by mining revenues.

The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2023 also weakened regional integration. Nigerian presidential spokesperson Sunday Dare said the departure of the three countries had triggered a regional crisis and weakened protocols supporting the free movement of goods and services. The assessment amounts to an acknowledgement that the AES bloc, formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has permanently altered the security architecture of West Africa.



DRC AND RWANDA.

Clashes between AFC/M23 rebels and the FARDC and allied Wazalendo militias reignited during the night of 2–3 September in the Masisi area of North Kivu. Fighting began around 18:00 in the villages of Malemo, Kazuba, and Kalibiri in the Bashali Mokoto grouping and continued the following day. Local sources reported that the rebel forces had received reinforcements.

Since the fall of Goma and Bukavu in January–February 2025, AFC/M23 has gone beyond fighting on the military front. It has built a parallel administration in the areas under its control and expanded a proto-state structure by appointing educators, governors, and mayors.

According to a report by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), a radio station north of Goma was converted into an intelligence office for AFC/M23. In the Fizi area of South Kivu, Twirwaneho fighters allied with AFC-M23 took control of the village of Nakihele, less than 100 kilometres from the centre of Fizi, demonstrating the alliance's expansion towards the south.

On 27 August, a civilian aircraft carrying humanitarian aid to Minembwe was brought down. AFC-M23 blamed the attack on the FARDC and claimed that the aircraft was carrying essential supplies to civilians in South Kivu. The FARDC announced in an official statement dated 3 September that it had launched large-scale military operations in the Mambasa area of Ituri. In Kamanyola, Walungu in South Kivu, four people were killed and one was injured when an improvised explosive device detonated after being triggered by a bushfire. The incident demonstrated how explosive remnants of war continue to threaten civilian life in the region.

The crisis also gained momentum on the diplomatic front. On 2 September, Rwandan President Paul Kagame met with James Swan, the new head of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), to discuss the security crisis in eastern DRC. Swan had arrived in Rwanda one day earlier.

This showed that diplomatic efforts remained active. During the same week, DRC President Félix Tshisekedi made a working visit to Angola's Cunene province at the invitation of Angolan President João Gonçalves Lourenço. The two sides discussed bilateral cooperation, while the visit also highlighted Luanda's role in regional mediation. African Union leaders had gathered in Luanda one week earlier to strengthen the continent's conflict-prevention capacity. This raised the question of whether Africa's early warning mechanisms can be translated into effective action, both in the DRC and in the Ethiopia-Tigray tensions discussed below.



SOMALIA.

An airstrike on the home of General Mahad Abdirahman Aadan, a senior commander loyal to Laftagareen and known by the nickname «Shub», in the city of Doolow in the Gedo region triggered a strong reaction. Regional authorities alleged that the strike was carried out by Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles. The South West State Ministry of Information strongly condemned the attack and reported that it had generated a broad political and public backlash linking both Türkiye and the Somali federal government to an alleged assassination attempt.

The general survived with minor injuries. The incident is significant because it represents the direct involvement of Türkiye's military cooperation with Somalia in the country's internal regional power struggles. It strengthens the perception that Mogadishu's security partnership with Ankara has become a weapon for one side in the Baydhabo crisis.

Meanwhile, piracy along the Somali coast reached its highest level in a decade. Eight vessel hijacking incidents have occurred since late April. Two of them took place two weeks apart in August. One targeted an Iranian-linked oil tanker, while the other targeted the Cameroon-flagged Lutuf, which was carrying military supplies for Türkiye. The Somali federal government condemned the resurgence of piracy. It attributed the increase to a combination of the damage caused by the US-Iran war to maritime shipping and political instability in Somalia.

The Chinese navy began patrols against piracy along the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. During the same week, the United States expanded construction of a new military facility at the Puntland port of Bosaso, which will serve as a hub for combat and surveillance operations against ISIS and al-Shabaab. In Kismayo, the US military conducted a major training exercise to strengthen the readiness of the East Africa Response Force (EARF).



MOZAMBIQUE.

In Mozambique, Islamic State-linked Ahlu Sunna wal-Jamaa (ISM) militants attacked a tourist hunting camp in Marrupa district in the northern province of Niassa on 3 September. The attack targeted a camp operated by Mozambique Wild Adventures. One woman was killed and a member of the Defence and Security Forces (FDS) was wounded.

The attackers seized vehicles and set fire to homes and a health centre. Around 15 tourism company employees were forced to flee. The attack displaced more than 2,700 people. Niassa State Secretary Silva Livone assessed that the attack had been carried out by the same Islamist militants operating in Cabo Delgado and called on the FDS to intensify operations in the area.

The attack is significant because it marked ISM's first visible presence in Niassa since May last year. In August, the group's presence in neighbouring Montepuez prompted the US State Department to declare travel to Niassa particularly risky because of hunting activities and to advise against all travel to the province.

The attack could force hunting tourism operators to suspend their activities in the area. At the same time, it creates a dilemma for security forces, which have so far relied on aircraft and trained guards provided by tourism and conservation companies to prevent ISM from establishing a permanent presence in Niassa..

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado, which has continued since 2017, has killed thousands of people and displaced hundreds of thousands.

This violent environment continues to shape the security costs of TotalEnergies' \$20 billion Mozambique LNG project. Political tensions are also continuing inside the country. Opposition leader Venancio Mondlane is awaiting trial before the Supreme Court on five charges linked to protests following the October 2024 elections. He received notification on 25 August. The trial is expected to begin within two to three months.



ETHIOPIA.

Immediately after African Union leaders met in Luanda a week earlier to strengthen conflict prevention capacity, tensions in northern Ethiopia began testing the continent's early warning mechanism. Relations between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) have been deteriorating for more than a year due to disputes over the implementation of the African Union-mediated Pretoria Agreement to End the Conflict, signed in November 2022.

The two sides have accused each other of military mobilisation. Unresolved questions over the status of disputed territories and the safe return of displaced populations continue to fuel tensions. Human Rights Watch called on the African Union to intensify its engagement with the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF, warning that the fragile peace could collapse.

In the Amhara region, fighting between the Fano militia movement and federal and regional forces is also continuing. In the town of Gunde-Meskel in the Dera area, soldiers affiliated with the Oromo Prosperity Party reportedly detained at least six residents.

Residents of Raya Alamata reported facing hunger, drought, and human rights violations.

Diaspora organisations issued an urgent call for allegations of mass atrocities in Ethiopia to be subject to an independent international investigation. Meanwhile, Ethiopia's four-year National Dialogue Conference began on 15 July and ended on 22 August. The process was structured around eight main thematic pillars and included the federal city status of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa as its third pillar. However, it failed to halt the de facto conflicts in Amhara and Tigray.

Nile water diplomacy also remained on the agenda. Tibor Nagy, a former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, argued that Egypt needs to accept a new regional reality and recognise Ethiopia's right to develop the Blue Nile.

He said Cairo can no longer dictate terms based on its historical advantage. The statement represented another dimension of Nile Basin diplomacy surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, reflecting the shifting balance of regional power.



NIGERIA.

Kidnapping for ransom surged again in Nigeria shortly after the government announced its largest single-day hostage rescue operation. Celebrations over the rescue of 300 people abducted during raids in two north-central states in early August were short-lived. Two weeks later, armed men abducted nearly 600 worshippers from a mosque in Niger State.

According to a report by Lagos-based SBM Intelligence, Nigerians paid nearly \$6 million in ransom to kidnapping gangs in the year through June, more than three times the amount paid during the previous 12-month period. More than 7,800 people were kidnapped during the same period. According to an analysis by The Guardian, kidnappings are spreading to new areas, with young children also among the victims. Military intervention alone is not resolving the problem.

Operations against Boko Haram and ISWAP continued in the northeast. In the Kukawa area of Borno State, Operation Hadin Kai troops found the bodies of nine Boko Haram/ISWAP militants following a failed attack on soldiers. The militants were believed to have been killed in airstrikes carried out by the Nigerian Air Force.

During the same week, a Boko Haram militant surrendered in the town of Pulka in Gwoza with an RPG launcher and ammunition. In the northwest, Operation Fansan Yamma troops neutralised several terrorists in Zamfara and Kaduna states and seized a large shipment of ammunition. In Taraba, Operation Whirl Stroke troops raided a suspected terrorist hideout. In Kogi, they rescued two female hostages.

However, a coordinated new attack on Pulka showed that Boko Haram and ISWAP were attempting to re-establish control in south-eastern Borno. Displaced Christian families reported a renewed rise in threats to “convert or face attack”.

It also emerged that ISWAP commanders were using generative artificial intelligence for tactical purposes. Former militants said the group had established dedicated “prompt engineering” cells and encrypted satellite links financed by Islamic State central leadership. Regional governments were assessed to be technologically behind on the battlefield.

In the Niger Delta, the security crisis took a different form. At least 37 people died after inhaling crude oil vapour during oil theft in the Okrika area of Rivers State. The incident once again highlighted the human cost of pipeline sabotage in the region.

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SOUTH AFRICA.

A wave of anti-migrant violence that had continued for weeks in Durban flared up again in early September. On 3–4 September, around 100 members of the anti-migrant group “March and March” raided a camp housing hundreds of undocumented migrants outside a Department of Home Affairs building as part of what they called a “clean-up operation”. At least five migrants were injured, four were hospitalised, and one person was arrested. Most of the migrants were from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda.

At least four foreign nationals have been killed during the violence that has continued for weeks. Tens of thousands of people have left the country. Nigeria evacuated 1,695 of its citizens from South Africa this year. Of these, 1,490 were evacuated through government-supported arrangements and 205 through private donations.

In Cape Town, the military has been deployed in the city’s Cape Flats area since April 2026 to reduce the murder rate. Around 200 soldiers are stationed in the area under Operation Prosper, with the mission planned to continue until March 2027.

Between April and June 2026, 646 murders were recorded in the Cape Flats, 95 fewer than during the same period last year. The daily average fell from eight to seven. However, it remains unclear whether the decline is attributable to the military deployment or to other factors.

DIPLOMACY

LIBYA

Libya reached a critical juncture in its efforts to overcome political deadlock with the UN-supervised 4+4 Committee agreement. The agreement aims to resolve provisions concerning candidacy for presidential and parliamentary elections, establish a mechanism for restructuring executive authority, and appoint a new head of the High National Elections Commission.

However, this positive step on paper quickly faced opposition from influential factions within the High Council of State and the House of Representatives. Presidential Council Chairman Mohamed al-Menfi and Zawiya MP Abdullah al-Lafi abstained, while Musa al-Koni, the deputy representing the south, supported the agreement. This demonstrated the depth of divisions within the executive branch.

On the military front, senior commanders from eastern and western Libya met in Sirte on 9 September and agreed on a four-point cooperation plan covering joint exercises, weapons, logistics, and military training. The initiative was described as part of efforts to unify the country's divided military institutions.

At the same time, Libya dismantled a cell responsible for attacks on oil and energy facilities. However, the US State Department renewed its highest-level travel warning for Libya due to crime, terrorism, health risks, civil unrest, kidnapping, and landmine threats, advising Americans not to travel to the country for any reason.

Egypt and Tunisia stressed the need to preserve Libya's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity following talks between their foreign ministers. They also reiterated their support for an inclusive political process leading to simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections.

Nabil Fahmy, the Arab League's new Secretary-General, called for a "renewed Arab agenda" in his first ministerial-level appearance after taking office. The Libya file was included on the organisation's agenda for its 166th session under the Tunisian presidency. Tunisian President Kais Saied received Fahmy at the Carthage Palace on 8 September, where they discussed regional developments.



MOROCCO- ALGERIA

The mass migrant entry into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta on Morocco's northern coast on 30–31 July continues to generate diplomatic tensions between the three countries months later. According to a report submitted by Spanish police to the Audiencia Nacional and reviewed in full by Afrik.com, around 80,000 people moved towards the border over the two-day period.

The movement was organised on social media and spread on the ground. The report did not attribute responsibility to smuggling networks. It found that Moroccan security forces had shown no “serious effort” to prevent the flow of migrants towards the border, while some police officers reportedly showed migrants which crossing points to use. Despite this finding of “full tolerance”, the report failed to identify those behind the operation.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez told parliament that there was “no” evidence that Morocco had planned or facilitated the mass border breach. However, the crisis developed into a major political crisis inside Spain. Tens of thousands of Spaniards took to the streets to protest the government's handling of the crisis. Sánchez faced accusations that he had ignored warnings and failed to secure the border.

According to a poll, a majority of Spaniards disapprove of Sánchez's handling of the Ceuta crisis. Support for the two major right-wing parties rose above 50%. On 8 September, Spanish authorities opened an official investigation into the crisis under Audiencia Nacional judge María Tardón. The case is based on findings from the CENIF report, including the mobilisation organised through social media and allegations that Moroccan security forces directed migrants towards the border.

In early August, some Spanish and Moroccan media outlets raised the hypothesis that Algeria may have been involved in the crisis, based on Algerian-coded numbers identified in mobilisation groups. The CENIF report contains no evidence supporting this claim and classifies it as part of the counter-narrative that emerged after the crisis.

Despite the diplomatic tensions, the crisis did not overshadow Morocco's regional humanitarian role. On 4 September, the Royal Moroccan Navy rescued 117 West African migrants aboard a pirogue heading from Gambia towards the Canary Islands. The group consisted of 84 Gambians, 24 Sierra Leoneans, seven Senegalese, and two Malians.



SOUTH SUDAN

South Sudan took rapid steps to remove constitutional obstacles on the road to the general elections scheduled for 22 December 2026. On 1 July, parliament approved provisions of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) that removed the census and permanent constitution-making process as prerequisites for the elections. On 1 September, the same amendment was incorporated into the transitional constitution. The bill was passed unanimously in a single day.

President Salva Kiir approved the constitutional amendments removing legal obstacles to the elections. The SPLM party also accelerated grassroots mobilisation across the country. The African Union called on member states and international donors to help close the funding gap for the elections, setting October as the deadline. A \$223 million funding gap needs to be covered. However, criticism is growing that holding elections does not in itself amount to establishing a legitimate political order.

The leadership crisis within the SPLA-IO, the main armed wing of the opposition, deepened. Senior officials remain divided over who should lead the movement in the absence of former First Vice President Riek Machar, who is being detained. The movement's military spokesperson, however, said there would be no armed internal conflict.

The SPLA-IO command approved the appointment of Regina Joseph Kaba as interim deputy leader of the party. UN human rights experts are due to visit the country as preparations for the elections continue amid renewed conflict, Machar's detention, and delays in implementing key provisions of the 2018 peace agreement.



The cabinet reshuffle initiated by Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is continuing. On 2 September, Tebboune also convened the High Security Council to discuss forest fires affecting the country and the fight against drug trafficking.

The council called for the death penalty to be applied to crimes linked to arson. It also decided to establish a new specialised unit dedicated to combating drugs and to convert a People's National Army barracks in Tanzeurouft into a high-security prison. The decisions show that Algeria is taking a tougher approach to its internal security agenda and is increasingly treating forest fires as a national security issue rather than an ordinary natural disaster.

ALGERIA

DIPLOMATIC AGENDA ACROSS AFRICA

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the “Correct the Map” resolution, which seeks to represent Africa and other regions in their actual proportions on world maps, with 164 votes in favour, one against, and six abstentions.

The resolution was submitted by Togo on behalf of the African Group, representing 54 African countries, with the support of the African Union. The United States cast the only vote against the resolution. Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey stressed that maps are far more than simple geographical representations and presented the resolution as a symbolic correction to the historical distortion of Africa’s representation in the world.

During the same week, Somalia became the 50th country to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) after depositing its instrument of ratification at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa.

The move reflects both Mogadishu’s emphasis on regional economic integration and its efforts towards diplomatic normalisation despite the country’s internal security crises.



A wide-angle, high-angle photograph of a massive open-pit mine. The mine is characterized by numerous horizontal terraced levels, creating a stepped appearance. In the center of the mine, a large, calm lake with a distinct turquoise or light blue hue is visible. The surrounding landscape is arid and rocky. In the foreground, a dirt road or path leads towards the mine, and a small portion of a yellow mining vehicle is visible on the left. The sky is overcast with grey clouds.

ENERGY AND MINING

LIBYA

On 3 September, the Airport Road depot operated by Brega Petroleum Marketing Company in Tripoli was targeted by an unidentified drone. The object landed near one of the depot's storage tanks. There were no casualties. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) condemned the incident and said fuel distribution had not been disrupted.

On 6 September, Defence Ministry sources announced the arrest of a sabotage cell held responsible for attacks on oil and electricity facilities in Tripoli and Zawiya. This indicated that the isolated drone attacks targeting critical infrastructure since February were not isolated incidents.

The attack took place amid growing tensions. Members of the Oil Facilities Guard had issued the government a 48-hour ultimatum over salaries and housing conditions, while the same unit at the Sharara field had given authorities a one-week deadline.

Despite this, NOC data showed that Libya's crude oil production exceeded 43 million barrels in August, an increase of around 1.55 million barrels from July's 41.713 million barrels. During the same week, the El-Harouj Oil Operations Company, affiliated with the Sirte Oil Production and Processing Company, drilled and connected the

B79A replacement well at the Amal field to the production line.

The Zelten field, Libya's first oil field, was transferred by the Sirte Company to a new US oil company for development. Chinese companies also expressed their readiness, through the China Petroleum Chamber of Commerce, to contribute to Libya's oil, gas, and renewable energy sectors.

Despite the increase in production, the domestic fuel and electricity crisis is worsening. Residents of Zawiya announced plans to protest over power cuts lasting up to 15 hours. Water prices in the Jazirat and Al-Jazira areas also rose as production and energy problems became increasingly interconnected. This contradiction highlights the structural limits of Libya's rentier state model. Despite its large hydrocarbon resources, the country remains trapped in a cycle of crises because public finances lack an effective channel for converting higher production into services and stability.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's assessment that global energy markets were experiencing a "shock" due to the war in Ukraine, attacks on Russian energy facilities, and the ongoing conflict with Iran places the attacks on Libya's infrastructure within the broader global energy security picture.



NIGERIA

Revenue at the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) fell by 1.3 trillion naira in July 2026 to 3.09 trillion naira, well below the 4.39 trillion naira recorded in June.

During the same period, the company announced that the Obiafu-Obrikom-Oben gas pipeline was ready for first gas, while the Ajaokuta-Kaduna-Kano gas pipeline was 95% complete. Nigerian electricity distribution companies installed meters for 308,106 customers during May–June. However, modular refineries supplied only 18.35 million litres of diesel in July, while petroleum marketing companies imported 244.9 million litres during the same month. This shows that domestic refining capacity remains far from sufficient to meet internal demand.

The World Bank announced that it would support reforms to Nigeria's electricity tariff and subsidy framework. Nigeria and the International Energy Agency also signed a Joint Work Programme to strengthen strategic cooperation on energy policy and security.

On 3 September, around 37 people involved in oil theft in the Okrika area of Rivers State died after inhaling vapour released from the crude oil they were stealing. The incident once again highlighted the human cost of the illegal refining economy in the Niger Delta. During the same week, the Nigerian Navy dismantled illegal refining sites in the region and seized 99,000 litres of stolen crude oil.

The Refinery Owners Association called on the government to strengthen the domestic refining industry. Dangote Petroleum Refinery, meanwhile, signed registration documents for a public offering. The company presented the move as an opportunity for a broad segment of society, from drivers to domestic workers, to become shareholders.

More than 150 oil and gas projects across Africa have been suspended due to weaker investment flows. This shows that the financing pressure facing Nigeria is part of a broader continent-wide pattern.



SUDAN- UGANDA

Energy Minister Motasim Ibrahim Ahmed said the electricity sector had been subjected to “unprecedented attacks” targeting its infrastructure and personnel. In South Kordofan, a drone strike hit two trucks belonging to the World Food Programme (WFP). The Sudan Founding Alliance (TASIS) attributed the attack to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

The United States is seeking to bring a resolution before the UN Security Council aimed at extending the arms embargo imposed on Darfur since 2005 to all of Sudan. The initiative seeks to limit arms flows across the country. However, the situation on the ground presents a different picture.

Ugandan authorities named the country’s first commercial crude oil blend “Pearl Sweet”. The move added a symbolic milestone to the country’s target of achieving commercial production by the end of the year. President Yoweri Museveni stressed that the planned refinery, together with the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), remains a priority. He said Uganda’s oil resources could transform the economy if they are managed strategically and linked to industrialisation.

Uganda and Ghana are seeking to deepen cooperation on pre-production oil governance. This reflects Uganda’s effort to turn its emerging producer status into a regional reference point.

Presidents Emmerson Mnangagwa and Daniel Chapo announced an expansion that will increase the capacity of the Beira-Harare fuel corridor by 67%. Chapo described the move as an important milestone in economic integration between Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

During the same week, the vulnerability of African economies to the Strait of Hormuz crisis became more visible. Diesel prices in Lagos nearly doubled, fishing boats in Maputo were kept ashore, and construction projects in Addis Ababa were suspended, with workers sent home.

According to calculations by Ecofin Agency, the war with Iran added \$21.9 billion to the fossil fuel import bills of 32 African countries between March and August 2026. Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, and Tanzania were among the hardest hit, while major exporters such as Nigeria, Angola, and Libya benefited from higher prices.

This divide is widening the vulnerability gap between Africa’s energy-importing and energy-exporting countries.

MOZAMBIQUE- ZIMBABWE

ANGOLA- TUNISIA- LIBYA

Angola's National Oil, Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANPG), ExxonMobil Angola, and the partners in Block 15 announced a new discovery at the Vicango Este-01 offshore well.

It was the twentieth discovery made in the block over a period of 30 years. During the same period, Angola announced the deployment of six maritime drone helicopters to protect its maritime economy.

The move directly targets the security of offshore oil assets and should be viewed alongside the increased pace of exploration.

The Libya-Tunisia joint venture Joint Oil opened a new bidding round on 7 September for exploration in the oil block shared by the two countries and for the development of the Zarat offshore discovery.



Table: Key Energy Developments of the Week

Country	Project/Company	Value	Detail
Libya	NOC / August production	43 million barrels	Increase of 1.55 million barrels from July
Nigeria	NNPC / monthly revenue	3.09 trillion naira	Decline of 1.3 trillion naira from June
Zimbabwe-Mozambique	Beira-Harare pipeline	Capacity +67%	Joint announcement by Mnangagwa and Chapo
32 African countries	Iran war / energy bill	\$21.9 billion	Additional cost between March and August 2026, according to Ecofin Agency
Angola	ExxonMobil / Block 15	20th discovery	Vicango Este-01 offshore well
Africa-wide	Oil and gas projects	150+ projects	Suspended due to declining investment

MINING

DRC

Kinshasa is preparing to bring geological data under state control in the mining sector of the world's largest cobalt producer and second-largest copper supplier. Through aerial photogrammetry, the digitisation of historical archives, and the creation of a national geological database, the Congo aims to reduce exploration risks for critical minerals and expand state influence over the development of future mineral discoveries.

The move is aligned with Kinshasa's decision to ban exports of copper-cobalt concentrate.

Former US congressional adviser Gregory P. Tosi wrote that if the policy closes legal export channels faster than domestic processing capacity can develop, part of the mining sector could be pushed into the parallel economy and existing smuggling networks in the east could be strengthened.


Meanwhile, US buyers are turning to DRC copper priced at a discount to COMEX-approved brands. This has pushed registered copper imports from the Congo to the United States to record levels, although China remains the country's largest buyer.

In South Kivu, the Ministry of Mines established an ad hoc commission to inspect the compliance of companies operating in Mwenga, Fizi, Uvira, Baraka, and Shabunda from 31 August. The move followed growing complaints from civil society about illegal mining activities.

Copper mining activity is also continuing in eastern Congo. US-based Copper Intelligence announced that its first six-hole drilling programme at the Butembo Copper Project identified a near-surface copper grade of 5.39% over 7.55 metres.

The global copper market provides an important backdrop to these developments. Australian-based ANZ forecasts that copper prices could reach a record \$15,000 per tonne in early 2027 due to tight mine supply, strong demand, and possible US tariffs.

The DRC's export restrictions and control over geological data can be interpreted as an attempt to strengthen Congo's bargaining power precisely in this price environment. However, the smuggling risk highlighted by Tosi raises questions about the state's ability to effectively capture these revenues.



SUDAN

At major trading centres in River Nile State, the price of one gram of gold was set at 877,000 Sudanese pounds on 3 September, while the buying price stood at 865,000 pounds. As the price approached the one-million-pound threshold, it was being directly driven by fluctuations in the parallel exchange rate.

Production is concentrated in this state because the Ministry of Mines has lost control over production in Darfur and Kordofan since the outbreak of the war. In northern Sudan, a religious dispute at the Jebel al-Bum artisanal mining market in the Ebri area escalated into violence, resulting in a mosque being set on fire and its contents being destroyed.

The incident came in the same week as the US-backed UN initiative seeking to extend the Darfur arms embargo to the entire country. The overlap between artisanal gold production falling outside state control and armed groups' search for financing parallels the pattern highlighted in ACLED's analysis of jihadist groups such as JNIM and ISSP in the Sahel.

According to this analysis, these groups generally do not operate the mines directly. Instead, they control nearby towns and roads, collect taxes from miners and traders, or seize and conceal gold.

President William Ruto announced that a new investor would take over mining operations at Lake Magadi following the revocation of Tata Chemicals Magadi's licence in July.

Former Cabinet Secretary for Investments, Trade and Industry Moses Kuria supported the government's decision. He argued that Kenya risks being left behind by Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and the DRC unless it fundamentally changes how it processes its natural resources.

The decision is consistent with Ruto's goal of expanding local processing capacity and can be seen as a sign that Kenya is entering a more interventionist phase in its approach to foreign capital.

Guinea, the world's largest bauxite exporter, now wants to process its ore domestically. Operators under pressure are working to build refining facilities, but energy shortages and environmental concerns continue to raise questions about whether these plants can operate at full capacity.

This move is part of the same regional trend as Ghana's model of increasing state participation in the gold sector and Nigeria's efforts to link its iron ore industry with steel production through cooperation with China.

West African governments are increasingly using stronger measures to push the transition from raw material exports towards domestic processing.

KENYA-GUINEA

NIGERIA

Following Guinea, China now seeks to link Nigeria's iron ore wealth to a domestic steel industry. The initiative can be seen as the second pillar of Beijing's raw material-to-industry integration strategy in West Africa, following the bauxite model in Guinea.

During the same week, proposals for Ghana to reduce its state stake by one-third and bring Shell and Chevron back into the system gained attention. There were also assessments that Ghana's gold formalisation model was attracting interest from other African countries, although the costs associated with formalisation were also highlighted.

These two examples show that the management of Africa's mining and energy assets is following a pendulum between increasing state participation and bringing foreign capital back into the sector.






Table: Key Mining Developments of the Week

Country	Project/ Company	Value	Detail
DRC	Kinshasa / geological data control	—	State control introduced alongside the copper-co-balt export ban
DRC-US	Copper imports	Record level	Priced at a discount to COMEX, while China remains the largest buyer
Global	Copper price, ANZ forecast	\$15,000/tonne	Record forecast for early 2027
Sudan	Gold per gram, River Nile State	877,000 SDG	Approaching the one-million-pound mark amid parallel exchange-rate fluctuations
Burkina Faso	Share of attacks on mines	75%	Based on ACLED's review of 44 AES sites
Kenya	Lake Magadi mine	—	Tata Chemicals licence revoked, with a new investor being sought
Guinea	Bauxite refineries	—	Energy shortages are limiting capacity

CONCLUSION

The week's energy and mining agenda shows that the gap between resource wealth and state capacity is repeating the same pattern from the Sahel to the Congo Basin, from the Nile Valley to the shadow of the Persian Gulf. Libya reached monthly production of 43 million barrels while its citizens continued to face power cuts lasting up to 15 hours. In Sudan, artisanal gold mines are becoming a financial lifeline for the war.

The DRC holds some of the world's most valuable copper and cobalt reserves, yet smuggling networks continue to expand in its eastern provinces. What these three cases have in common is that the crisis is driven less by production itself than by who controls the flow of the value generated. Wherever the state weakens, armed actors, smuggling networks, or rival political factions move into the resulting vacuum.

External actors are entering this space through different channels. Following its bauxite model in Guinea, China is moving toward iron ore and steel integration in Nigeria and remains the largest buyer of DRC copper. The United States, meanwhile, is turning to Congolese copper because of its pricing advantage over COMEX while seeking to extend the Darfur arms embargo to all of Sudan. This means Washington is expanding its influence in Central Africa through both commercial and security channels.

France is entering Malawi's rare earth supply chain, while Brazil has opened a perma-

nent trade hub in Ethiopia. This shows that traditional Western economic engagement with Africa is no longer limited to former colonial routes. The BRICS axis is also establishing a stronger presence on the continent in pursuit of supply security. Kenya's decision to remove Tata Chemicals from Magadi and Guinea's push to localise bauxite refining indicate that African governments are adopting a tougher negotiating stance towards Indian and multinational capital.

The Strait of Hormuz crisis, which added a \$21.9 billion bill to 32 African countries, made the divide between energy-importing and energy-exporting countries particularly clear this week. Importers such as Egypt, Morocco, and Tanzania struggled with higher diesel and electricity costs, while producers such as Nigeria, Angola, and Libya benefited from higher prices. Whether these gains translate into better services for citizens, however, depends on the state's capacity to distribute revenues.

As Libya's rentier crisis demonstrates, being an energy producer does not automatically bring stability. Where central authority is fragmented, oil and gold revenues can instead become a source that sustains the conflict itself. Forecasts that copper prices could reach a record \$15,000 per tonne in early 2027 coincide with the DRC tightening export restrictions and geological data controls at precisely this moment. As Kinshasa seeks to capture a larger share of the price rally, the risk that smuggling networks will also be drawn to the same profits is becoming increasingly important.



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